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Philosophers of language inspired by Grice have long sought to show 
how facts about reference boil down to facts about speakers’ communi-
cative intentions. I focus on a recent attempt by Stephen Neale (2016), 
who argues that referring with an expression requires having a special 
kind of communicative intention—one that involves representing an oc-
currence of the expression as standing in some particular relation to its 
referent. Neale raises a problem for this account: because some referring 
expressions are unpronounced, most language users don’t realize they 
exist, and so seemingly don’t have intentions about them. Neale sug-
gests that we might solve this problem by supposing that speakers have 
nonconscious or “tacit” intentions. I argue that this solution can’t work 
by arguing that our representations of unpronounced bits of language 
all occur within a modular component of the mind, and so we can’t have 
intentions about them. From this line of thought, I draw several conclu-
sions. (i) The semantic value of a referring expression is not its refer-
ent, but rather a piece of partial and defeasible evidence about what 
a speaker refers to when using it literally. (ii) There is no interesting 
sense in which speakers refer with expressions; referring expressions are 
used to give evidence about the sort of singular proposition one intends 
to communicate. (iii) The semantics–pragmatics interface is coincident 
with the interface between the language module and central cognition.
Keywords: Reference, compositional semantics, intentionalism, 
modularity, the semantics-pragmatics interface
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1. Intention-Based Semantics
The aim of intention-based semantics (IBS) is to show how the concepts 
and claims that fi gure in our best semantic and pragmatic theories boil 
down to facts about the mental lives of human agents.
IBS has traditionally taken the form of claims like (1), which is 
Grice’s mature explication of utterer’s occasion meaning —what we now 
usually call ‘speaker meaning’ (Grice 1968, 1969).
(1) “U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience 
 A, U uttereed x intending
  (i) A to produce a particular response r
 (ii) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1)
(iii) A to fulfi ll (1) on the basis of his fulfi llment of (2).
In keeping with the methodology of mid-Century analytic philosophy, 
Grice seems to have understood claims of this kind as conceptual anal-
yses. But, following Schiffer (1982) and Neale (2016), we can modernize 
the project by recasting it in terms of metaphysical explanation. Let us 
therefore construe (1) as a grounding claim—a claim about what kinds 
of psychological facts are metaphysically suffi cient for acts of speaker 
meaning.1 And, moreover, let us suppose for present purposes that (1) 
is a true grounding claim. Why should we take an interest in it?
One answer is that (1) tells us something central about the nature 
of meaning and communication. To mean something by an utterance is 
to perform the speaker’s half of an episode of communication. Commu-
nicative success further requires that the intended addressee recognize 
which kind of effect the speaker intends to have on them. By explicat-
ing speaker meaning as in (1), we learn that communication is a kind 
of mindreading—an application of our capacity to predict and explain 
agents’ behavior by inferring their mental states. To mean something 
by an act is to use it to intentionally trigger and guide the mindreading 
capacity of an addressee, in part by revealing one’s intention to do so.
Schiffer (1982) articulates broader ambitions for IBS. On his view, 
claims like (1) are crucial for the purposes of fi nding a place for mean-
ing in the natural order. By showing how linguistic meaning boils down 
to speaker meaning, how speaker meaning boils down to human psy-
chology, and, presumably, how human psychology boils down to physi-
ology and ultimately physics, we would naturalize the subject matters 
of semantics and pragmatics, rendering them unspooky. In Schiffer’s 
1 I take it that grounding is now a mature enough theoretical tool that I needn’t 
spend time defending my use of it. The curious or sketpical reader can check out the 
following sources for elucidations and defenses of the concept: Fine (2012); Rosen 
(2010); Schaffer (2009; 2015). Although there is no lack of controversy about the 
nature of grounding, none of this controversy bears on my project here. I should also 
clarify that it would not matter for present purposes if we were to understand (1) 
as a claim about reduction, real defi nition, or supervenience rather than grounding.
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view, this grand project hangs on the success of a string of claims like 
(1).2
Bracketing this grand naturalistic project, I think that claims like 
(1) can also offer us more modest and tractable payoffs. By revealing 
how our semantic and pragmatic capacities are grounded in indepen-
dently understood psychological capacities, we open up new possibili-
ties for explaining particular semantic and pragmatic phenomena, as 
opposed to merely describing and predicting them. Although this more 
piecemeal project is compatible with the grand naturalistic one, it also 
carries independent interest. Let me give two examples of what I mean 
before moving on to the business of this essay.
First, consider a pragmatic datum famously illustrated by Humpty 
Dumpty’s botched attempt, in Through the Looking Glass, to mean 
‘there’s a nice, knock-down argument’ by uttering the words ‘there’s 
glory for you’. The lesson would seem to be that a speaker can’t use 
any string of words to mean anything they want. But why not? What 
is it about the nature of speaker meaning that explains this fact? Some 
have been tempted to make the considerable leap from the falsity of 
Humpty Dumptyism to the truth of conventionalism, which is the idea 
that meaning something by an utterance is essentially a matter of 
conforming to linguistic conventions.3 But conventionalism struggles 
to explain the many ways in which we communicate unconvention-
ally—by speaking indirectly or non-literally, or by behaving passive-
aggressively, for example. And these are cases that intentionalism has 
ample resources to explain. Each is a case of getting one’s intentions 
recognized after all; it’s just that we sometimes rely on unconventional 
evidence of our intentions to supplement, override, or take the place 
of linguistic evidence. What explains the apparently conventional con-
straints on speaker meaning, then? Intentionalists have replied that 
these constraints have nothing to do with conventions per se. Instead, 
they follow from independently motivated principles governing the in-
teraction of beliefs and intentions in human minds. As most philoso-
phers of action will tell you, it is either irrational or impossible to in-
tend to do something that is ruled out by one’s beliefs.4 A rational agent 
who intends an addressee to recognize their intentions knows that they 
must provide evidence. A speaker can provide straightforwardly con-
ventional evidence (as in the case of direct, literal speech), a mixture of 
conventional and overriding unconventional evidence (as in the case of 
indirect and nonliteral speech), or entirely unconventional evidence (as 
in fully non-conventional communication). This way of thinking about 
2 It should be noted that although Schiffer was initially optimistic about this 
project (Schiffer 1972; 1982), he eventually became disillusioned with it (Schiffer 
1987).
3 The classic defense of conventionalism is due to Searle (1965; 1969). A notable 
recent defense has been given by Lepore and Stone (2015).
4 For variations on this principle, e.g. Bratman (1987); Broome (2013); Donnellan 
(1968); Grice (1971); Holton (2011); Neale (2004; 2016).
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things rules out the kind of Humpty Dumptyism that we should want 
to rule out—namely, the idea that it is possible to mean anything by 
any utterance, irrespective of whether the speaker believes that their 
the utterance (together with whatever else is available) provides the 
intended addressee with adequate guidance. By linking speaker mean-
ing to the speaker’s intentions, we are thus able to explain a pragmatic 
datum in terms of what is independently known about human agency.
A second example of psychological explanation in IBS comes from 
my own recent work on the semantics of imperatives.5 Here a central 
datum is that certain inference patterns involving imperative clauses 
strike us as valid. For example:
(2) Buy me a drink!
  If you don’t go to the bar, you can’t buy me that drink.
  So, go to the bar!
One of the jobs of a semantic theory is to predict our intuitions about 
validity. But the usual strategy of taking validity to be a matter of truth 
preservation doesn’t apply here, because imperatives aren’t truth apt. 
IBS offers the crucial elements of an alternative strategy. The central 
ideas of this solution are plucked from Grice (1968; 1969), who argued 
that literal utterances of unembedded declaratives are intended to pro-
duce beliefs, that literal utterances of unembedded imperatives are in-
tended to produce intentions to act, and that the meaning of a clause 
is a matter of the kind of effect that speakers use it to provoke. These 
ideas can be used to animate a formal-semantic theory on which the se-
mantic values of declarative and imperative clauses, respectively, are 
the beliefs and intentions that they are characteristically used to pro-
duce, and complex, multi-clausal sentences encode more complex in-
tentional mental states. On this view, we can predict that an inference 
will seem valid if a rational mind that exemplifi es the semantic values 
of the premises also exemplifi es the semantic value of the conclusion. 
These ideas allow us to recognize our intuitions about validity as the 
linguistic refl exes of underlying principles governing the structural ra-
tionality of beliefs and intentions. The inference pattern exemplifi ed by 
(2), for example, refl ects our sensitivity to the principle usually called 
strict means-end coherence:6
(3) STRICT MEANS-END COHERENCE
  For any agent α and actions φ and ψ, α is irrational if α intends 
  to ψ, believes that φing is necessary for ψing, but does not in
  tend to φ.
5 See my dissertation (Harris 2014) for the broad outline and my manuscript, 
‘Imperatives and Intention-Based Semantics’ (Harris MSa), for the formal-semantic 
and foundational details.
6 For defenses of some variations on (3), see Bratman (1987); Broome (2013); 
Holton (2011).
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By marrying IBS to semantic theorizing in this way, my ambition is to 
move beyond the mere prediction of semantic data, and toward theo-
retically motivated explanations of them.
2. Cognitive Architecture
Intention-based semantics has traditionally traffi cked in psychologi-
cal states and processes that are wholly visible from the intentional 
stance. The key items in its explanatory toolkit are intentions, beliefs, 
and other posits of folk psychology. I think that we have reason to ex-
pand this toolkit. After all, the only rational communicators we know of 
are humans, and contemporary cognitive science has uncovered many 
phenomena in human minds that are not susceptible to folk-psycholog-
ical understanding.
In particular, I think that we have good reasons to think of the mind 
as being carved up into one or more central cognitive systems and an 
array of peripheral modules.7 An example of the kind of module I will 
discuss is the part of the human mind that is responsible for syntactic 
processing, which I will call the ‘human sentence processing mecha-
nism’ (HSPM). The HSPM has several of the features of modules that 
interest me.
First, it is informationally encapsulated: in carrying out its opera-
tions, the HSPM has access only to a proprietary database of syntactic 
principles. It does not have access to information stored in central cog-
nition, including the agent’s conscious or unconscious beliefs, desires, 
or intentions. This is illustrated by the fact that the knowledge that one 
is about to perceive a garden-path sentence, such as ‘the old man the 
boat’, typically does not stop garden-path processing errors from taking 
place. A clear explanation is that garden-path sentences are unusual in 
that they violate the expectations embodied in the heuristics used by 
the HSPM to parse sentences’ syntactic structures. Because the HSPM 
is modular, it lacks access to centrally available information, such as 
the belief that the sentence being read is a garden-path sentence. Cen-
tral cognition, where this belief resides, simply isn’t capable of inter-
vening in order to avoid an error.8
7 The classic defense of modularity is due to Fodor (1983). Recent defenses 
include Firestone and Scholl (2015) and Mandelbaum (2017). Note that I am not 
endorsing massive modularity—the view that even what Fodor took to be central 
processes can be decomposed into module-like subcomponents (Carruthers 2006; 
Sperber and Wilson 2002). However, what I say in this essay is compatible with 
massive modularity.
8 Two caveats. First, some central cognitive processes can change what gets 
perceived. A much-discussed example is attention, which is at least partially under 
cognitive control, and which can alter the information available via perception, 
including linguistic perception. But recent proponents of modularity have argued 
that the effects of attention on perceptual input systems are limited to various forms 
of signal boosting and input selection, which do not amount to central information 
being used by a modular process, and so should not be considered a true violation 
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Second, the HSPM is centrally inaccessible, which is to say that 
its inner workings and the proprietary database of syntactic principles 
that guide it are not available to central cognition. Whereas encapsula-
tion is a limit on the fl ow of information into a module, central inac-
cessibility is a limit on the fl ow of information out of a module. This 
feature is illustrated by the fact that we have no capacity to introspect 
either the processes by which the HSPM constructs syntactic repre-
sentations or the syntactic principles on which it draws in doing so. 
This is what makes linguistics so diffi cult: we must laboriously reverse-
engineer that to which we have no direct cognitive access.9
Modules have several other features that are worth noting. Modules 
are domain specifi c, in that they deal only with a proprietary genre of 
input. The HSPM deals only with linguistic representations, for exam-
ple. Modules are fast and mandatory, in that they do their job quickly 
and in a way that is not subject to the agent’s conscious will. We are 
powerless to avoid immediately perceiving as meaningful sentences of 
languages that we speak, for example, and this is because the HSPM is 
fast and mandatory. Moreover, the states and processes of the HSPM, 
like other denizens of modules but unlike central-cognitive states and 
processes, are ineligible for consciousness and are folk-psychologically 
intractable. Unlike the processes of central cognition, however, modu-
lar processes are susceptible to computational modeling. The HSPM 
is a prime example: syntacticians have made remarkable progress in 
modeling the proprietary database on which it draws, and psycholin-
guists have made remarkable progress in modeling the processes by 
which the HSPM acquires this database and deploys it in syntactic 
processing.
Modularity has been studied mainly as a property of perceptual in-
put systems. But I will be concerned with modular output systems as 
well.10 Take the HSPM: we need to build syntactic representations as 
part of the process of designing our own utterances, and not merely as 
part of the process of perceiving the utterances of others. To be sure, 
of informational encapsulation (see, e.g., Firestone and Scholl 2015). Second, I am 
interested in modules qua output systems as well as input systems, and output 
systems are clearly responsive to central cognition in some respects, since that is 
where their inputs come from. It may help to clarify that the encapsulation of a 
modular system requires only that it it be insensitive to central representations 
other than those that it is designed to take as inputs. I will return to this issue below.
9 Again, a caveat: the HSPM does send some information to central cognition, 
including the outputs of its perceptual processing and perhaps error messages 
when things go wrong. The point of inaccessibility is that these outputs, and not the 
various representations involved in producing them, are the only representations 
that bridge the gap between modules and central cognition.
10 The standard focus on input systems begins with Fodor, who discusses them 
almost exclusively, although he does indicate that he is optimistic that much of 
what he says will also apply to “systems involved in the motor integration of such 
behaviors as speech and locomotion” (Fodor 1983: 42). For the idea that motor control 
is mediated by modular systems, see also Levy (2017); Stanley (2011).
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speech production is not as well understood as the speech perception, 
but it is not hard to see that it bears many of the hallmarks of modular 
processes. Like speech perception, the syntactic processing of outputs 
is domain specifi c and fast. (It’s less than clear what it would mean for 
it to be mandatory.) It is susceptible to computational modeling but 
opaque from the perspective of folk psychology and the speaker’s own 
conscious thought. The details of syntactic processing, along with the 
database on which it draws, are just as centrally inaccessible on the 
way out as they are on the way in.
The question of encapsulation is complicated by the fact that speech 
production takes its marching orders from central cognition: my HSPM 
designs and outputs an utterance (with the help of other systems) as a 
result of my intention to speak or write. By concentrating, moreover, 
I can intentionally slow down the utterance-design process and con-
sciously decide between different ways of formulating an utterance. I 
can ask myself whether it would be better to say ‘driver’ or ‘chauffeur’, 
for example, and I can even decide that the passive voice might sound 
better on a particular occasion.
However, there are severe limitations on the capacity of central cog-
nition to intervene in the syntactic design process. Although this point 
about encapsulation is, strictly speaking, separate from the point that 
syntactic design is centrally inaccessible, the two points are easily un-
derstood together. Since central cognition lacks access to the principles 
governing syntactic construction, and to at least some of the concepts in 
terms of which these principles are framed, it can’t very well intervene 
in a fi ne-grained way in that process. By way of example, consider an 
occasion on which I utter (4):
(4) Malik promised Kate to turn off the stove.
Our best syntactic theory tells us that the embedded infi nitival clause 
in (4) has a phonologically null subject, PRO, which, since ‘promise’ is a 
subject-control verb, is bound by ‘Malik’. So, the process leading up to 
my uttering (4) involved my HSPM representing it as having the fol-
lowing structure (and much more):
(5) Malik1 promised Kate [PRO1 to turn off the stove].
Let’s assume that contemporary syntacticians are right about this, and 
that the HSPM of a competent English speaker who utters (4) repre-
sents the sentence being uttered as in (5). Clearly, this speaker would 
have no central-cognitive access to this representation. Indeed, most 
speakers would lack the conceptual resources to centrally represent 
sentences as in (5), since their central systems do not possess concepts 
of PRO, subject control, or coindexing, and are blissfully unaware that 
any part of them represents sentences as having properties like these. 
Even those of us who are aware of these facts did not become aware as 
a result of our central systems gaining access to our HSPMs, but rather 
as a result of a slow and grueling reverse-engineering project that has 
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taken decades and that remains incomplete. But since we have no cen-
tral access to representations like (5), our central systems also have 
no way of intervening in the construction of such representations. A 
language user would be powerless to intentionally edit (5) so that it 
comes out as (6), for example—not just because they don’t know how 
to centrally access representations of this kind, but because this sort 
of editing is not the kind of input that central cognition can send to the 
HSPM.
(6) Malik promised Kate1 [PRO1 to turn off the stove].
The bottom line is that ‘promise’ is a subject-control verb because the 
HSPM treats it as one, and our central system(s) simply have no say 
in this matter.
The syntactic processing of linguistic outputs therefore deserves 
to be thought of as encapsulated in the following sense: although this 
process takes inputs from central cognition, central cognition is pow-
erless to intervene in its intermediate stages, or in ways that would 
require access to (and the ability to overrule) the HSPM’s proprietary 
database. This leaves some interesting questions unanswered. Most 
pressingly: how rich are the inputs that central cognition sends to the 
modular components of utterance design? I cannot adequately address 
this issue here, but I will briefl y return to it in §7.
The picture that emerges is one of mental subcomponents, includ-
ing the HSPM and central cognition, that can transmit information 
to one another in only limited ways, and that would not be capable of 
handling many of one another’s representations because they lack the 
informational and conceptual resources to do so.
These issues about cognitive architecture are relevant to IBS be-
cause IBS aims to reveal the psychological facts that ground our ca-
pacity to communicate with language, and there are good reasons to 
think that some of these facts concern modular input/output systems. 
Take the example I’ve just been discussing. My ability to produce and 
understand utterances of sentences like (4) depends on the fact that I 
have a properly functioning HSPM whose database includes principles 
governing control and binding. If this is so, then our strategy for imple-
menting IBS will have to be constrained in some ways. We shouldn’t 
assume that speakers’ capacity to communicate with syntactically 
well-formed sentences is wholly grounded in facts about their beliefs 
and intentions, for example, since beliefs and intentions are denizens 
of central cognition. And likewise, any theory that takes the process of 
utterance design to be a rational, central-cognitive one that is wholly 
mediated by intentions and means-end reasoning will be fl awed for the 
same reasons.
I have argued elsewhere that much of what semanticists study 
should likewise be thought of as a modular system—one that could be 
thought of as either a neighbor to or a subcomponent of the HSPM.11 
11 See the manuscript, ‘Semantics without Semantic Content’ (Harris MSb).
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If so, then parallel issues apply to the ways in which IBS can fruit-
fully study the psychological underpinnings of compositional seman-
tics. This point will loom large in what is to follow, and I will return to 
it in some detail in §5. First, I need to say more about semantics itself, 
and about the role that reference is thought to play in semantics in 
particular.
3. Reference
Reference is widely thought to be among the central concepts of seman-
tics and pragmatics, and there is a tradition within IBS of attempt-
ing to show how facts about reference boil down to facts about human 
psychology.12 A central thread running through this tradition is the 
idea that reference is, or is primarily, a thing that speakers do, not a 
relation borne by linguistic expressions (either types or tokens) to their 
referents (even relative to contexts). This fi ts with the broader strategy 
of explaining semantic facts in terms of facts about the actions or dispo-
sitions of speakers, which are in turn explained in terms of facts about 
speakers’ mental lives.
What makes reference such an indispensable concept in the fi rst 
place, so that it deserves the full IBS treatment? As I see it, refer-
ence standardly plays two important roles, one in semantics and one 
in pragmatics.
In standard semantic theories, reference is the relation that ties 
certain lexical items—type-e expressions, or referring expressions—to 
their compositional semantic values.13 Since standard theories assume 
that the referents of these expressions function as inputs to semantic 
composition, semantics as we know it can’t get off the ground unless 
reference supplies the raw materials. If we want to show how semantic 
facts, standardly understood, are grounded in facts about the psychol-
ogy of rational communicators, then, these sorts of facts about refer-
ence will have to be included.
12 Aside from Neale (2004; 2016), who is my foil here, some other works in this 
tradition include Bach (1987; 1992); Bertolet (1987); Schiffer (1981); Stine (1978). 
An important precursor is Strawson (1950). Others who have given intention-based 
accounts of reference, though not explicitly in the IBS tradition, include Heim (2008); 
Kaplan (1989a); King (2013; 2014); Kripke (1977); Michaelson (2013).
13 By “standard semantic theories”, I mean those that build on the framework 
codifi ed in the two most infl uential textbooks, Heim and Kratzer (1998) and von 
Fintel and Heim (2011). Of course, there are alternative frameworks, but most of 
the differences aren’t ultimately relevant to the point of this essay. For example, 
in Jacobson’s (2014) variable-free framework, the semantic value of ‘he drinks’ is 
the property of drinking, restricted to males. On Jacobson’s view, it is a pragmatic 
matter for speaker and addressee to coordinate on a particular male and apply this 
property to them. But this is just to say that there is only speaker’s reference on 
Jacobson’s view—something that IBSers have long argued. It would therefore be 
easy to fi t variable-free semantics into much of the dialectic that is to come.
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There are some independent reasons to think that the concept of 
reference that is at work in semantics must be spelled out in terms 
of speakers’ intentions. The point is perhaps clearest with respect to 
variables, including pronouns, such as ‘she’, ‘it’, and ‘that’. Variables 
can occur either bound or free, and this is standardly accounted for by 
taking each occurrence to possess a numerical index and relativizing 
its semantic value to whichever assignment function is operative in 
the context. An assignment function is a mapping from numerical in-
dices to elements in the domain of entities, De. The semantic values of 
unbound occurrences of pronouns are given by the following semantic 
clause.
(7) For any variable v, numerical index i, and assignment g, ⟦vi⟧g = 
  g(i)
Thus we wind up with the following assignment-relative intension[ as]
the semantic value for ‘he drinks’, in which ‘he’ occurs unbound:14
(8) ⟦He1 drinks⟧g = λw . g(1) drinks at w
Binding, on standard views, is understood as a compositional operation 
that reduces the assignment dependency of the resulting expression by 
λ-abstracting over all free variable occurrences with a given numerical 
index, turning them into argument positions in a complex predicate. By 
relativizing free variables’ semantic values to assignment functions, we 
are therefore able to give a unifi ed account of free and bound variables.
Where is reference in this picture? The standard answer is that un-
bound occurrences of variables are referring expressions, and the enti-
ties to which assignment functions map them are their referents. What 
refers to what is therefore a matter of the operative assignment. What 
determines which assignment is operative? Semanticists often dodge 
this question, or say something vague about “context” determining an 
assignment. For example, Heim & Kratzer say that “the physical and 
psychological circumstances that prevail when an LF is processed will 
(if the utterance is felicitous) determine an assignment to all the free 
variables occurring in this LF” (1998: 243). But most of those who have 
devoted serious thought to the question have argued that something to 
do with the speaker’s intentions must be what does the job. For exam-
ple, in more recent work, Heim says that “the relevant assignment is 
given by the utterance context and represents the speakers referential 
intentions” (2008). Kaplan (1989a), King (2013; 2014), and others have 
given similar, intentionalist accounts of how the referents of (at least 
some) unbound pronouns are fi xed.
In addition to the foregoing semantic role for reference, it is also 
common to give reference a pragmatic role in explaining how speakers 
sometimes convey information about entities other than those to whom 
14 Most semanticists would say that this treatment applies only to deictic 
occurrences of pronouns, and distinguish, in addition to deictic and bound 
occurrences, unbound anaphoric occurrences. I will ignore this complication for now, 
since it’s really just the deictic cases that interest me.
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semantics tells us they should have referred. The most infl uential ar-
ticulation of this idea is due to Kripke, who uses the following example 
(Kripke 1977: 263):
Two people see Smith in the distance and mistake him for Jones. They have 
a brief colloquy: “What is Jones doing?” “Raking the leaves.” “Jones,” in the 
common language of both, is a name of Jones; it never names Smith. Yet, in 
some sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have 
referred to Smith, and the second participant has said something true about 
the man he referred to if and only if Smith was raking the leaves (whether 
or not Jones was).
Kripke concludes that, in addition to semantic reference, we must also 
posit a notion of speaker’s reference, which is also grounded in the inten-
tions of the speaker, but which is less beholden to linguistic convention. 
Whereas semantically referring to Smith requires not only intending to 
say something about him, but also using an expression that linguistic 
convention provides for this purpose, an act of speaker’s reference can 
break free of conventional constraints.
What should be the goal of IBS when it comes to to reference? If we 
take mainstream semantics and pragmatics at face value, we’ll need 
to show how facts about both semantic reference and speaker refer-
ence are grounded in underlying facts about speakers’ minds. One way 
to implement this strategy would be to distinguish semantic reference 
from speaker reference before explicating the former in terms of the 
latter and the latter in terms of underlying psychological concepts.15 
Such a strategy would be in keeping with the spirit of Grice’s original 
articulation of IBS, in which utterance-type meaning (a.k.a. ‘timeless 
meaning’) is explicated in terms of speaker meaning, which in turn is 
explicated in terms of speakers’ intentions.
This is not the main strategy that proponents of IBS have tradi-
tionally pursued, however, and so I will not focus on it here. Instead, 
IBSers have tended to argue that semantic reference, understood as a 
(context-relativized) relation borne by expressions to their referents, is 
not a genuine phenomenon, and that both the semantic and pragmatic 
roles of reference can be played by concepts of speaker reference. Put in 
terms of Strawson’s (1950: 326) slogan, referring “is not something an 
expression does; it is something that some one can use an expression 
to do.”
Although there are several versions of this idea, I will focus on the 
version developed by Neale (2016).16 According to Neale, we need two 
15 As Neale (2016) points out, this is not Kripke’s strategy in ‘Speaker’s Reference 
and Semantic Reference’ (1977). Kripke instead does the reverse, explicating speaker 
reference in terms of semantic reference. King (2013; 2014) pursues a different 
strategy, putting both speaker reference and semantic reference on an explanatory 
par, while explicating both in terms of speakers’ intentions (at least when it comes 
to context-sensitive referring expressions).
16 Neale’s theory of referring is a further development of Schiffer’s (1981) theory. 
Some other accounts in a similar spirit have been developed by Bach (1987); Bertolet 
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concepts of reference. The fi rst is what he calls ‘speaker reference’
(SR) Speaker Reference
 In φ-ing, S referred to o iff what S meant by φ-ing is an o-depen-
dent proposition (a singular proposition that has o as a constitu-
ent).
As Neale points out, the idea here is to think of speaker reference as 
nothing more than a special case of speaker meaning—namely, the case 
in which what is meant is a singular, object-dependent proposition. If 
our theoretical repertoire already includes some concept of speaker 
meaning—for present purposes, it doesn’t matter which version—and 
if we assume that humans sometimes communicate object-dependent 
information, then it follows without any further assumptions that 
Neale’s notion of speaker reference is at least sometimes applicable.
One nice thing about (SR) is that it is highly versatile. In order 
to refer, on this view, there needn’t be any linguistic expression with 
which one refers. As Neale (2016) argues at length, this is desirable 
because it allows us to make sense of the ways in which we can refer 
silently. In response to a question about what Smith is doing, one can 
say ‘raking the leaves’, thereby referring to Smith without uttering any 
expression with which one refers to him, for example. And, Neale ar-
gues, we should sometimes say that an agent has referred to someone 
or something even with an utterance that is neither linguistic or con-
ventional in any way. Suppose that Malik visits Anne’s apartment and 
fi nds that the place is a huge mess. “What happened!?”, Malik asks. In 
response, Anne merely rolls her eyes and gives a furious look. Malik 
knows that only one thing can make Anne this angry—her good-for-
nothing roommate, Chad—and so Malik correctly infers that, by her 
eye roll, Anne meant that Chad was responsible for the mess. Accord-
ing to Neale, Anne was referring to Chad, simply because her eye roll 
was a means of communicating a singular proposition about Chad. And 
I agree that this captures at least one sense in which communication 
sometimes involves referring. In particular, (SR) gives us a notion of 
reference that can play the pragmatic role, since it allows for the pos-
sibility of referring to someone without using an expression that, ac-
cording to convention, can be used to refer to them.
But the concept of reference spelled out in (SR) can’t play the semantic 
role that reference is usually thought to play. This is because (SR) gives 
us no resources to connect particular referring expressions to their refer-
ents on particular occasions—no way of linking referring expressions to 
their semantic values for the purposes of compositional semantics.
For this purpose, Neale identifi es a second concept of referring:17
(RW) Referring-With
(1987); Stine (1978). The central points of the present essay could be aimed at any 
of these views.
17 This idea is closely modeled on Schiffer’s (1981) concept of referring-by. The 
two differ in some ways that are not relevant here.
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 In uttering x, S referred to o with e, relative to its i-th occurrence 
in x, iff for some audience A and relation R, S intended A to rec-
ognize that R(e,i,o) and, at least partly on the basis of this, that 
S referred to o in uttering x.
Every instance of referring-with is also a case of speaker reference, but 
not vice versa. Referring-with requires more: it requires the speaker to 
have intentions about a particular occurrence of a particular expres-
sion, a particular referent for this occurrence, and a particular relation 
R that ties all three together. It is this added specifi city that allows 
referring-with to play the semantic role by supplying occurrences of 
referring expressions with their semantic values.
Why shouldn’t we just think of (RW) as Neale’s defi nition of seman-
tic reference? There are at least two good reasons. First, referring-with, 
so defi ned, is clearly something that speakers do with expressions, 
rather than something that expressions themselves do.18 Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, referring-with needn’t be mediated by lin-
guistic convention in any way. This is because the relevant R-relation 
varies greatly between cases. It may sometimes be a conventional rela-
tion. For example: if I refer to Lincoln with ‘Lincoln’, it is likely that 
a conventional, lexically encoded relationship linking the name to the 
man is at least part of what plays the role of (RW)’s R-relation. But 
suppose that my friend and I see someone approaching in what looks 
like a pirate shirt, and I say ‘what’s the deal with Sinbad?’. In this case, 
I’ve referred to the approaching person with ‘Sinbad’, but not because 
‘Sinbad’ conventionally refers to him. Here, I intend my friend to recog-
nize that both the name ‘Sinbad’ and the approaching person’s shirt are 
evocative of pirates, and it is this non-conventional relation that plays 
the role of the R-relation.
On Neale’s view, then, referring expressions don’t refer of their 
own accord. On a given occasion, it is the speaker’s job to plug in their 
compositional semantic values by referring with them. Moreover, the 
semantic value of a referring expression on a particular occasion may 
be unconventional and ad hoc. Although the lexicon may contain the 
information that ‘Lincoln’ is sometimes used to refer to Lincoln, it is 
possible to override this sort of lexical guidance, using a name to refer 
to someone or something novel, in which case this novel entity serves 
as the name’s semantic value.
What does this theory predict about Kripke’s scenario, in which a 
speaker utters ‘Jones’ but conveys information about Smith? Neale 
doesn’t say, but it seems to me that there are different options, depend-
ing on details of the case and background theoretical commitments 
about the metaphysics of intentions. A crucial aspect to this case is 
that the speaker falsely believes, of the man raking the leaves, that 
18 Interestingly, one could make the same case about Kripke’s defi nition of 
semantic reference. However, my next point clearly does not apply to Kripke’s 
defi nition.
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he is Jones. So, it is at least initially plausible to attribute at least the 
following (RW)-instantiating intentions (and possibly even more) to the 
speaker on this occasion.
(RW1) S intended A to recognize that is-usually-called(‘Jones’, 1, Jones) 
and, at least partly on the basis of this, that S referred to Jones 
in uttering ‘what is Jones doing?’.
(RW2) S intended A to recognize that is-usually-called(‘Jones’, 1, 
dthat[the man raking leaves]) and, at least partly on the basis of 
this, that S referred to dthat[the man raking leaves] in uttering 
‘what is Jones doing?’.19
(RW3) S intended A to recognize that S-uttered-xn-while-looking-at-
y(‘Jones’, 1, Smith) and, at least partly on the basis of this, that 
S referred to Smithin uttering ‘what is Jones doing?’.
(RW4) S intended A to recognize that S-uttered-xn-while-looking-at-
y(‘Jones’, 1, Jones) and, at least partly on the basis of this, that 
S referred to Jones in uttering ‘what is Jones doing?’.
One theoretical option for Neale is to say that the speaker has all of 
these referential intentions, and so refers to both Smith and Jones with 
‘Jones’ in this case. On this view, the speaker’s sentence has two dif-
ferent semantic values on this occasion. A second option would be to 
think of one of (RW1–4) as the speaker’s only real intention, or as the 
primary or governing intention, to which the others are somehow sub-
servient. On this view, it is the governing intention that matters, at 
least for the purpose of semantic reference.20 A third option is to argue 
that in cases of this kind, when the speaker’s intentions are incoher-
ent or confl icting, something has gone so wrong that it does not make 
sense to say that any referring has occurred at all.21 This idea is most 
plausible when we try to say what it would take for a hearer who is not 
confused about the identities of Smith and Jones to correctly interpret 
the speaker in this case. There seems to be no fully satisfying answer: 
although the hearer could diagnose the speaker’s confusion, correct in-
terpretation seems out of the question. I won’t try to decide between 
these three ways of understanding Kripke’s case here. I think that all 
three are worth seriously considering.
What is so attractive about Neale’s account of referring-with?22 
From the point of view of IBS, the answer is clear: the view, if it works, 
gives us a concept of reference that does the work we need it to do in se-
mantics and pragmatics, and that is wholly grounded in the same sorts 
19 Following Kaplan (1978; 1989b), I use ˹dthat[the φ]˺ as a referring expression 
that refers to whatever is denoted by ˹the φ˺. For some complications about how to 
interpret ‘dthat’, see (Kaplan 1989a: 579–582).
20 This is similar to a strategy that King (2013) uses to account for similar cases.
21 For different versions of this idea, see Michaelson (2013) and Unnsteinsson 
(2016).
22 And, by extension, what is so exciting about Schiffer’s theory of referring-by, 
on which Neale’s view is based?
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of independently motivated cognitive resources—intentions, beliefs, 
etc.—that we know and love. The theory therefore delivers a seemingly 
crucial component of what IBS has promised us.
4. The Aphonic-Intention Problem
Unfortunately, there is a serious problem with this theory of reference 
as it stands, and with (RW) in particular. Neale calls this problem ‘the 
aphonic-intention problem’.23 It arises when we consider the full range 
of referring expressions that have been posited by contemporary phi-
losophers and semanticists, some of which are phonologically null or, 
as Neale says, aphonic.
Consider (9), for example.
(9) It’s raining.
Stanley and Szabó (2000) have infl uentially argued that sentences of 
this kind contain an aphonic variable (which I will write ‘loc’), which 
refers to a particular location on particular occasions of utterance. In 
uttering (9), one never says that it is raining, full stop, after all. Rather, 
one always says of some place that it is raining there. According to 
Stanley and Szabó, it is the aphonic referring expression loc that allows 
one to accomplish this act of referring, and so the LF of (9) includes loc, 
as in (10).
(10) It’s raining loc1.
A crucial part of Stanley and Szabó’s argument for this claim—and, 
in particular for the claim that loc should be considered a variable—is 
that loc can seemingly be bound, as in (11).
(11) Everywhere I go, it’s raining.
This sentence has a covarying reading, on which it means, ‘everywhere 
I go, it’s raining there’. According to Stanley and Szabó, the best ex-
planation of this reading of (11) is that loc is bound by the adverbial 
quantifi er, ‘everywhere I go’, as in (12).
(12) [Everywhere I go]1 it’s raining loc1.
But if we need to posit loc in this case in order to explain covarying 
readings, theoretical economy recommends positing it as an unbound 
referring expression in (9) as well.
This argument is controversial, and various ways of resisting it 
have been proposed.24 However, aphonic variables have been posited in 
analogous treatments of many other constructions, including quanti-
23 This problem is a further development of Schiffer’s (1992; 1994) “meaning-
intention problem”. But whereas Schiffer’s problem deals with the implausibility 
of saying that language users have intentions about some of the things they are 
purported to refer to, Neale’s problem deals with the implausibility of saying that 
language users regularly refer with certain expressions. I should say, at the outset, 
that I do not propose to deal with Schiffer’s problem in this paper.
24 See, for example, Neale (2007a;b; 2016); Recanati (2004; 2010).
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fi ers and defi nite descriptions (Stanley 2002; Stanley and Szabó 2000) , 
proper names (Fara 2015), adjectives (Kennedy 1999, 2007; Rett 2015), 
modals (Stone 1997), tense (Partee 1973), and many other expressions. 
And other aphonic expressions have been posited on syntactic grounds. 
These include PRO (“big pro”), pro (“little pro”), and t (“trace”), and the 
phonologically null pronouns in pro-drop languages, such as aphonic 
Italian subject expressions. Moreover, some of these, including Italian 
null subjects, can have unbound, referential occurrences. Thus we have 
a multitude of reasons for thinking that there are at least some aphonic 
variables, and I will assume that this is so.
The aphonic-intention problem arises because, according to Neale’s 
view, referring expressions get their semantic values because speak-
ers refer with them, and referring with an expression requires having 
intentions about it. But if many natural-language sentences contain 
aphonic referring expressions, this story becomes implausible, as there 
are excellent reasons to think that ordinary speakers do not know of 
the existence of these expressions. But how can someone have an in-
tention about an expression about whose existence they are unaware? 
Without going so far as to endorse it, Neale articulates a reply to the 
aphonic-intention problem, which he calls the ‘tacit-states reply’. This 
reply draws on Chomsky’s (1980) idea that some of our knowledge 
of language is ‘tacit’, and Loar’s (1981) idea that communicative in-
tentions, and beliefs about them, are often unconscious, tacit mental 
states. In particular, according to the tacit-states reply, we must nor-
mally posit a tacit intention that instantiates (RW) whenever a speaker 
refers with an aphonic expression.
5. The Aphonic-Intention Problem 
and Cognitive Architecture
I don’t think the tacit-states solution to the aphonic-intention problem 
will work. To be sure, I have no problem with the idea that some of our 
intentions are unconscious. Contemporary cognitive science has shown 
that our minds are replete with unconscious mental states, including 
beliefs and desires. It would be bizarre to think that intentions are 
somehow special in that they must be conscious. The claim that there 
are tacit intentions is somewhat more diffi cult to evaluate, since there 
is no settled understanding of what ‘tacit’ means. But, if we take it to 
mean that agents sometimes have intentions that they are unaware of 
themselves as having, and that they would not report themselves as 
having if asked, then I see no problem with this.
But deeper problems lurk. For example, there are some competent 
speakers who aren’t merely unaware of the existence of aphonic ex-
pressions; because of their philosophical beliefs, they actively deny that 
aphonics exist. Let us stipulate, for the sake of argument, that they are 
mistaken in this belief. Still: their belief does not impair their ability to 
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discuss the weather, to use restricted quantifi ers, or to speak Italian, 
and so it must not be interfering with their capacity to refer with apho-
nics. The tacit-intentions advocate is therefore not merely forced to say 
that agents are unaware of their tacit states and cannot report them; 
they must also say that these tacit states are unaffected by confl icting 
conscious beliefs and intentions. An agent who believes that aphonics 
don’t exist, but who (tacitly) intends to refer with an aphonic, exempli-
fi es a pattern of thought that intentionalists deem either impossible or 
irrational: they intend to φ despite believing that it is not possible for 
them to φ. This is a strange conclusion: although aphonic-deniers may 
be mistaken, it seems overly harsh to accuse them of irrationality. Af-
ter all: they may have been led to their position by solid (if ultimately 
misleading) reasoning.
Similarly strange is the idea that many language users are able 
to have (tacit) intentions about aphonics despite apparently failing to 
possess some of the very concepts in which these intentions are framed. 
For example: most speakers seem to lack the concept of an aphonic, or 
of any of the particular aphonics that linguists and philosophers have 
posited. Aphonics like loc, PRO, domain-restriction variables, and null 
Italian subject expressions are all theoretical discoveries, and getting 
a lay speaker to have beliefs about them seemingly requires teaching 
them substantial amounts of linguistic theory, much as getting some-
one without scientifi c training to have thoughts about subatomic par-
ticles requires teaching them some physics. Lay speakers not only fail 
to have conscious thoughts about these aphonics; they seemingly lack 
the conceptual capacity to do so.
We can sum up the last two paragraphs by saying that, if speakers 
have tacit intentions about aphonics, then these intentions are both 
inferentially and conceptually isolated from their conscious mental 
states. This is not a feature that we normally expect from run-of-the-
mill non-conscious mental states. And so, in positing tacit intentions 
about aphonics as part of our solution to the aphonic intention problem, 
we adopt a theory of tacitness that makes it something much more 
substantial than mere non-consciousness. We would need a theory of 
tacitness that allows tacit mental states to live a life of their own—one 
that is cut off from conscious mental states (and most non-conscious 
states as well).
Rather than developing an elaborate theory of tacitness, I think 
that we should seek an explanation in terms of modularity. If human 
minds contain representations of aphonic expressions, then these rep-
resentations exist not in central cognition, but only inside of the lan-
guage module.25 The evidence for this hypothesis is relatively clear. 
The fact that language users’ conscious thoughts are inferentially and 
conceptually isolated from their representations of aphonic expressions 
25 Of course, there may be various language modules or sumbmodules, but I will 
ignore this detail for now.
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is clearly predicted, for example, since the language module is informa-
tionally encapsulated and centrally inaccessible. Because of encapsula-
tion, a language user’s denial that aphonics exist cannot interfere with 
the module’s representation of aphonic expressions. And because the 
module and central cognition each possesses a proprietary database of 
information, framed at least partly in terms of proprietary conceptual 
resources that the other may lack, we should expect the module to be at 
least partly conceptually isolated from central cognition.
Indeed, many aspects of semantic representation smack of modular-
ity. According to standard semantic theories, the principles governing 
semantic interpretation are framed in terms of concepts that most lan-
guage users do not possess at the level of central cognition, including 
functional application, assignment function, numerical index, semantic 
type, and so on.
Take a simple sentence like (13):
(13) He drinks.
Standard compositional-semantic theories tell us that (13) has a read-
ing on which processing it requires constructing a series of representa-
tions that includes (14).
(14) ⟦he1 drinks⟧g,c = λw . g(1) drinks in w
If this representation were a belief, then we would have to attribute 
concepts like assignment function and numerical index to all competent 
language users. Semantic competence with aphonic variables includes 
these conceptual competences, but also competence with concepts of 
particular aphonic expressions like PRO and loc. We could say that such 
beliefs are tacit, but this would be no more satisfying than saying that 
the principles and conceptual competences governing the HSPM are 
tacit. Describing the situation in terms of modularity is preferable be-
cause modularity is posited explicitly in order to explain the ways in 
which certain mental states are informationally and conceptually iso-
lated from central cognition, in just this way.26
A good working hypothesis is therefore that if being a competent 
language user entails representing sentences as in (14), these repre-
sentations are not centrally accessible, and cannot be manipulated in 
any detail by central cognition. In particular, it seems clear that, in 
most language users, central cognition lacks the conceptual resources 
to work with with representations like (14). Indeed, we know about 
26 The idea that compositional semantics is the study of the inner-workings of a 
modular system would also explain a few other things. For example: semanticists 
have had a great deal of success with the project of computationally modeling 
humans’ semantic competence—a hallmark of modular systems. Likewise, we 
tend to quickly and automatically experience linguistically formatted stimuli as 
meaningful, even when we believe them to have been the product of random forces. 
(The canned example is of stones on a beach, blown by a hurricane into a pattern 
resembling a sentence.) This suggests that semantic processing is, to a considerable 
extent, cognitively impenetrable. I consider some further arguments in Harris (MSb).
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such representations only as the result of a grueling, decades-long re-
verse-engineering project that is still unfi nished. In other words: rep-
resentations like (14), and all representations of aphonic expressions 
as well, are modular.
The idea that all of our representations of aphonics live inside of 
modules poses a devastating problem to Neale’s theory. After all, in-
tentions do not live inside of modules, but are paradigmatically cen-
tral representations, along with beliefs, desires, and other posits of folk 
psychology. But from these facts, together with the fact that modules 
are informationally encapsulated and centrally inaccessible, it follows 
that there cannot be intentions to refer with aphonics that instanti-
ate (RW). Such intentions would require violations of the informational 
and conceptual boundaries between central cognition and the language 
module. Indeed, given the role of assignment functions and numerical 
indices in semantic representations of referring expressions, it seems 
that nearly all instances of (RW) would involve violations of this kind.
6. Compositional Semantics and Modularity
I therefore think that Neale’s tacit-states reply cannot save his theory 
of reference. In particular, I think that any theory of referring that 
requires speakers to have central representations of referring expres-
sions in order to use them cannot be made to work. But without (RW), 
Neale has no notion of reference that can play the semantic role out-
lined in §3—no way, that is, of saying how the semantic values of refer-
ring expressions are fi xed.
It might be tempting to try to solve this problem by fi nding some 
other kind of mental states that could play the role of fi xing the refer-
ents of referring expressions—not intentions, but states of a kind that 
could reside wholly within the language module. However, I don’t think 
this is a realistic option. My reason is that any such state would have 
to be capable of representing both referring expressions and their ref-
erents. The former is no problem, since the language faculty specializes 
in representing linguistic objects. But, in using a sentence containing 
a referring expression, humans can refer to anything, including things 
that the language module lacks the conceptual resources to represent, 
since representing such things requires background knowledge about 
the extra-linguistic world. In short: if the picture I have painted of hu-
man cognitive architecture is correct, then there is no place in the hu-
man mind for reference-fi xing mental representations to reside.
I will therefore propose an alternative theory—one that I have de-
fended elsewhere on related grounds.27 The key to this view is that we 
must change our understanding of how compositional semantics works 
in such a way that there is no longer any semantic role for reference 
to play. According to standard theories, compositional semantic val-
27 See Harris (MSb).
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ues are contents, in Kaplan’s (1989b) sense. The content of a referring 
expression is its referent, and the content of a (declarative) sentence 
is a proposition. Because some expressions have different contents on 
different occasions, the interpretation function must be relativized to 
contextual parameters, including assignment functions. Semantics, on 
this view, is the study of how the contents of complex expressions are 
determined as a function of the (possibly context-relativized) contents 
of their parts.
I think that we should abandon this view in favor of a different con-
ception of semantics. On the account I prefer, semantics is the study of 
the semantic component of the language module. The job of this module 
is to encode and decode partial and defeasible perceptual evidence of 
speakers’ communicative intentions. When someone speaks, their lan-
guage module encodes in an utterance evidence of the general kind of 
thing that they mean, on the assumption that they are speaking liter-
ally and directly. When a hearer perceives an utterance, their language 
module decodes this evidence, which tells the hearer what sort of thing 
the speaker means, on the assumption that the speaker is speaking 
literally and directly. We should think of this evidence as defeasible 
because we sometimes mean things other than what the linguistic evi-
dence would suggest. Suppose that I wryly say, ‘Joel is a fi ne friend’ in 
a situation in which it’s obvious that I don’t think Joel is a fi ne friend, 
in order to ironically implicate that Joel is actually a lousy friend. In 
this case, you have nonlinguistic evidence of my intentions that defeats 
the linguistic evidence I have given you. We should think of semantics 
as the study of partial evidence because the language module, being in-
formationally encapsulated, has no access to information about the ex-
tralinguistic context, and so cannot decode information about the con-
tents of expressions whose contents vary with context. Instead, what is 
encoded about such expressions—including many or perhaps all refer-
ring expressions—is information about the range of possible contents 
compatible with using them literally. On this view, we can think of the 
semantic value of a sentence as a property of propositions—namely, 
the property shared by all of the propositions that the sentence can be 
used to directly and literally mean on particular occasions of use. The 
semantic value of a referring expression can be thought of as a property 
shared by all of the things that a speaker can literally and directly refer 
to in uttering a sentence that includes the expression.
I am not the fi rst person to defend this conception of semantics. 
In fact, many IBSers have articulated similar views, at least in the 
abstract. According to Bach, we should think of the semantic values of 
sentences not as propositions but as “propositional radicals”, which are 
like propositions except that they do not fully specify the contents of 
context-sensitive expressions (Bach 1987: 2006). According to Sperber 
and Wilson (1995: 175) and Carston (2006: 633), semantic representa-
tions of sentences are not fully propositional, but are “schemas” that 
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must be supplemented with information available only to central cogni-
tion in order to arrive at a full representation of what is said. According 
to Schiffer (2003: §3.4), the semantic value of a sentence is its “charac-
ter*”, which is a partial specifi cation of the content and illocutionary 
force of the sort of speech act that would normally be performed with 
the sentence. Even Neale has advocated a similar view. He argues that 
“a semantic theory for a language L will provide, for each sentence X 
of L, a blueprint for. . . what someone will be taken to be saying when 
using X to say something” (Neale 2005: 189). These blueprints, he is 
clear, do not fully specify contents, but provide hearers with only par-
tial evidence of what a speaker has said.28
So there is a rich tradition within Intention-Based Semantics of 
denying that it is the job of semantics to fi x the referents of context-
sensitive expressions, including at least many referring expressions. 
I am only the latest participant in this tradition. However, until now, 
no advocate of this position has worked out the compositional-semantic 
details: no IBSer has given a precise account of what the semantic val-
ues of pronouns are, if not their (assignment-relative) referents, for 
example, and no IBSer has given a precise formal-semantic account of 
the kinds of non-propositional sentential semantic values they wish to 
posit.
I have attempted these tasks, and I will summarize my fi ndings 
here.29 The theory is designed to non-destructively extend standard se-
mantic accounts, namely those of Heim and Kratzer (1998) and von 
Fintel and Heim (2011). So, let us begin with a standard sentential 
semantic value of the kind they posit—say, (14):(14) ⟦he1 drinks⟧g,c = λw . g(1) drinks in w
This is a proposition, a function from worlds to truth values. But be-
cause ‘he’ is an unbound variable, (14) is an assignment-relativized 
proposition; it specifi es a proposition only relative to a given assign-
ment function. Since, as Heim (2008) tells us, “the relevant assign-
ment is given by the utterance context and represents the speakers 
referential intentions”, and since the language module has no access to 
information about extra linguistic context (particularly when it comes 
28 For some other proposals that are similar in some ways, see Barwise and Perry 
(1983); von Fintel and Gillies (2008); Swanson (2016). For some recent defenses of 
the distinction between semantic values and the contents of speech acts—though for 
different reasons and with different implications—see Ninan (2010); Rabern (2012); 
Stanley (1997); Yalcin (2007).
29 Note that there may be a much more elegant way to accomplish this task. For 
example, a more elegant implementation may be possible by drawing on resources 
from variable-free semantics (e.g. Jacobson 2014) or alternative semantics (e.g. 
Hamblin 1973; Rooth 1985; Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 2006), 
either of which is designed to deliver semantic values similar to those I discuss 
here. The semantics I sketch here is designed to non-destructively extend the most 
standard theories out there in order to show that my proposal does not depend on 
anything remotely exotic.
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to others’ mental states), (14) is not the sort of representation that the 
language module can work with.
What we need instead of (14) is a semantic value for ‘he drinks’ that 
needn’t be relativized to an assignment or a context in any way—a 
context-free semantic value. I propose that this is the right sort of thing 
to play the role that we want:
(15) ⟦he1 drinks⟧ = λpst . (∃xe : x is male)(p = λws . x drinks at w)
In English, (15) specifi es the property possessed by every proposition p 
such that, for some male x, p is the proposition that x drinks. Suppose 
that you overheard someone say ‘he drinks’, but know nothing of their 
intentions, or of the context in which they were speaking. What could 
you know about what they had said? Assuming that they were speak-
ing literally and directly, you would know that they had said, of some 
male, that he drinks. In other words, you would know that what they 
said is a proposition with the property picked out by (15). Situations 
of this kind—those in which you hear someone utter a sentence but 
know nothing about their intentions or the context—are useful think 
about because they approximate the position that your language mod-
ule is always in. Although your language module is capable of decoding 
linguistic evidence, it is by nature unable to integrate the information 
it decodes with information about the extralinguistic context. And so, 
(15) is just the sort of semantic representation that we should expect 
an English speaker’s language module to be capable of constructing. 
Notice, moreover, that (15) is not relativized to either an assignment 
or a context.
We can compositionally derive semantic values like (15) with min-
imal alterations to the standard semantic framework. We need only 
tweak the semantics of variables and add in a single composition rule. 
First, we must assign variables two kinds of lexical semantic value. 
First, we can have a single lexical entry that specifi es the assignment-
relative content of every variable.
(16) For any variable v and any assignment g, ⟦vn⟧g = g(n)
In the framework I am sketching, assignment relativity is present 
only at intermediate stages of semantic derivation. The semantic mod-
ule uses variable assignments only to track binding and coreference 
relations as it makes its way up a tree. This relativization is always 
eliminated in the fi nal representation of a sentential semantic value. It 
therefore doesn’t matter what assignments map numerical indices to. 
For present purposes, we can stipulate that (unmodifi ed) assignments 
always map each numerical index to itself, for example.
Next, we posit a second kind of lexical entry for each variable—one 
that specifi es the sort of evidence that an unbound use of this variable 
gives about the speaker’s communicative intentions. I will say that 
these lexical entries specify variables’ ‘constraint properties’, and I will 
symbolize the constraint property of a variable v as μ(v). The constraint 
properties of ‘he’ and ‘she’ are given as follows:
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(17) μ(he) = λxe . x is male
(18) μ(she) = λxe . x is female
In general, variables differ in meaning only insofar as they differ in 
their constraint properties.
Given this semantics for variables, how can we derive sentential 
semantic values like (15)? First, I make a syntactic assumption by pos-
iting bit of extra structure at the top of every sentence’s phrase struc-
ture. Take S nodes to be the usual sentence nodes. Then I will assume 
that every sentence consists of an SA (“sentence abstract”) node, with 
λp and S daughters, as follows:30
SA
               λp             S
Given this syntactic assumption, what we want is a composition 
rule that transforms the semantic values of S nodes—i.e., assignment-
relativized propositions—into the semantic values of SA nodes—i.e., 
unrelativized properties of propositions of the kind I described above. 
This principle should take us from ⟦S⟧g to ⟦SA⟧ in (19), for example:
(19)     ⟦SA⟧              = λpst . (xe : x is male)(p = λws . x drinks at w)
     λp        ⟦S⟧g
          = λw . g(1) drinks in w
The following compositional principle does what we want, in the gen-
eral case:31
(20) Proposition Abstraction
  Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ, where (a) β 
  dominates only λp, and (b) γ contains unbound variables ui…vn.
  Then ⟦α⟧ = λpst . (∃xi : μ(u)(xi)) … (∃xn : μ(v)(xn))(p = ⟦y⟧gxi/i…xn/n )
The intuitive idea behind this principle is that it defi nes the last opera-
tion on sentences’ semantic values before they are delivered to central 
cognition. All reference to assignment functions is eliminated, and so 
central cognition needn’t have the concept of an assignment or a nu-
merical index. Likewise, central cognition needn’t be capable of form-
ing representations of any particular lexical items, including aphonics. 
Instead, it need only be capable of forming representations of proposi-
30 Although this syntactic assumption makes for a clean presentation, it is not 
essential to the view I am presenting. We could instead get what we need by assuming 
that the language module does one fi nal transformation on its outputs before 
sending them to central cognition—a transformation that would be tantamount to 
the composition rule outlined below.
31 Notation: subscripts on variables are numerical indices, as usual. Superscripts 
on variables aren’t indices but merely devices for disambiguating variables.
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tions, properties of propositions, properties of entities, and so on. In 
effect, (20) cleans away anything that central cognition lacks the con-
ceptual resources to handle, and also relieves the language module of 
having to represent anything that it lacks the conceptual resources to 
handle.32
On this view, there need be no representation in the minds of speak-
ers or hearers that links each referring expression to its referent. In-
stead, referring expressions play a characteristic role in the produc-
tion and consumption of evidence about what speakers refer to in using 
these expressions. But we no longer have any need for the idea that 
speakers refer to things with these expressions, if this is to be under-
stood in Neale’s way, as involving mental representations that link 
each occurrence of a referring expression to its referent. We can dis-
pense with (RW) altogether, and make do only with speaker reference 
(SR). Reference thus winds up playing a much less central role than 
is usually thought. It plays no role in semantics, and it plays a role in 
pragmatics only in the innocuous sense that speakers sometimes com-
municate object-dependent information in a variety of ways. Referring 
expressions semantically enable this sort of communication by giving 
speakers a way of encoding evidence of their object-dependent inten-
tions, but that is all they do.
7. The Semantics–Pragmatics Interface, 
Inbound and Outbound
The picture I have sketched so far has some interesting consequences 
about the nature of the semantics–pragmatics interface. I have already 
indicated how I take the inbound semantics–pragmatics interface to 
work. The semantic module computes representations like (15)—con-
text-free properties of propositions—and sends them upstairs to central 
cognition, whose task is to infer which proposition with this property (if 
any) is the one that the speaker meant.
But what about the outbound semantics–pragmatics interface? 
(Maybe we should call it “the pragmatics–semantics interface”.) On 
the view I have sketched, this amounts to the following question: what 
kinds of instructions does the language module take from central cog-
nition during the utterance-design process? This is a hard question 
to answer, and there is much less empirical evidence to guide us. For 
now, I will do no more than briefl y point out some constraints on how 
the outgoing interface might work that follow from the picture I have 
sketched so far.
First, there are some constraints on what kind of instructions cen-
tral cognition can send to the language module that arise from the con-
32 I lay out this theory in greater detail, and show how to apply it to a wide range 
of other supposedly context-sensitive expressions, in ‘Semantics without Semantic 
Content’ (Harris MSb).
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ceptual limitations of central cognition. Speakers can’t intentionally 
meddle in the fi ner details of utterance design, because doing so would 
require having intentions about things that they do not, in general, 
have conceptual competence to centrally represent.
Second, there are some constraints on what kind of instructions cen-
tral cognition can send to the language module that arise from the con-
ceptual limitations of the language module. My language module isn’t 
the sort of thing that can know that the person in front of me is named 
‘Tom’, for example, because it lacks access to my beliefs about who is in 
front of me. If we think of propositions as intensions, or as structured 
Russellian complexes, then, we can’t assume that the instructions sent 
to the language module consist of just a proposition, without any fur-
ther instructions. Suppose, for example, that I am speaking to Tom, 
and I wish to tell him that he is silly. If propositions are structured 
Russellian complexes, then the content of what I say will be (21), and if 
propositions are intensions, then the content of what I say will be (22).
(21) ⟨Tom, silly⟩
(22) λw . Tom is silly at w
Given the situation I am in, this proposition (whichever kind of entity 
it is) is something I could say by uttering either (23) or (24).
(23) Tom is silly
(24) You are silly.
Given that I am addressing Tom, it would probably be much less con-
fusing to utter (24) rather than (23) in order to say what I want to say. 
But this is not a choice that my language module can make, since it 
lacks access to my belief that I am currently addressing Tom. Since 
speakers can reliably and intentionally utter ‘you’ in order to signal 
that they are referring to their addressee, the fact that they are refer-
ring to their addressee must be included in the instructions they send 
to their language modules. There are many ways that this might be 
accomplished. But for now I will simply point out that one way it could 
be accomplished would be if the instructions sent by central cognition 
to the language module are just the same kinds of semantic values that 
I have posited above. For example, the semantic value of ‘You are silly’ 
could be represented as follows:33
(25) ⟦you1 are silly⟧ = λpst . (∃xe : x is the addressee)(p = λws . x is silly 
   at w)
On this view, outgoing instructions to the language module don’t fully 
specify propositions, but only properties of propositions. Central cogni-
tion doesn’t tell the language module what it intends to say, but only 
the general kind of thing it wants to say. Crucially, this “general kind 
of thing” is specifi ed in a way that includes information about whether, 
for example, the proposition in question concerns the speaker’s address-
33 For more on how the semantic values of indexicals work in this framework, 
see Harris (MSb).
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ee. Since this sort of semantic value is the same kind of thing that the 
hearer’s language module decodes, there is a nice symmetry to this idea.
Although I can’t claim to have defended the foregoing view here, I hope 
to have shown that it is attractive enough to be worthy of further thought.
8. Speaker Reference without Semantic Reference?
How does the view I have sketched make sense of Kripke’s Smith–
Jones case? Recall that in this case, the following dialogue takes place:
(26) A: What is Jones doing?
  B: Raking the leaves.
According to Kripke, “in some sense, on this occasion, clearly both par-
ticipants in the dialogue referred to Smith” (Kripke 1977: 263). But it 
is also tempting to say that at least A, and possibly also B, has “in some 
sense” referred to Jones. And according to Kripke, we should resolve 
this dilemma by saying that A speaker-referred to Smith but semanti-
cally referred to Jones.
 Like Neale, I have options about what to say about this case, 
and it is unclear which option is best. First we should keep in mind that 
both utterances must be explained as arising from a case of identity 
confusion: they believe, of the man raking the leaves (i.e., Smith), that 
he is Jones. Because of this state of confusion, it is unclear whether to 
attribute Smith-dependent communicative intentions to our speakers, 
or Jones-dependent communicative intentions, both, or neither. Take 
B’s utterance. Which of the following intentions should be attributed to 
B?
(27) B communicatively intends for A to believe that Jones is raking 
  the leaves.
(28) B communicatively intends for A to believe that Smith is raking 
  the leaves.
One option is to say that there is no clear answer to the question of 
which of these was B’s intention. As I said in §3, I am tempted to say 
that although it is possible for a properly informed hearer to diagnose 
B’s confusion, there may not be a way of interpreting B such that genu-
ine communication results. This line of thought would seem to recom-
mend the conclusion that B has not genuinely referred to either Jones 
or Smith—B’s thoughts are simply too muddled to do this kind of ref-
erential work.34
There is another option, which is to say that one of (27) or (28) is 
B’s real intention—the one that really matters for communicative pur-
poses—and that the other is unimportant. This becomes plausible if we 
fl esh out Kripke’s scenario in one of the following two ways. First, sup-
pose that the main point of A’s exchange with B is to discuss the man 
raking the leaves, whoever he is. We may suppose, for example, that 
34 For a defense of this idea, see Unnsteinsson (2016).
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they are taking a walk around the neighborhood in order to see if any-
one is raking leaves, and that they don’t particularly care who. In this 
case, it is plausible that (28) is the intention that matters—the one that 
has to be interpreted in order for communication to succeed—and the 
fact that A used the word ‘Jones’ reveals merely incidental confusion in 
A’s mind. On the other hand, suppose that A and B have taken a walk 
around their neighborhood in order to see what Jones is up to. In this 
case, since what they really care about is Jones, it becomes plausible to 
say that (27) is the intention that matters. On this view, the question of 
which intention matters in cases of confusion depends on broader facts 
about the goals and interests of those involved in the conversation.
Both of these ways of thinking about the case are plausible and 
worth pursuing, and I won’t try to decide between them now. How-
ever, there is one remaining question about how I should make sense 
of Kripke’s case. On the theory I have given, there is no such thing as 
semantic reference, and nothing that even plays the role it is purported 
to play. What, then, is the source of the intuition that A semantically 
refers to Jones in uttering ‘What is Jones doing’ ? My answer is that, 
in uttering ‘Jones’, A gives potentially misleading evidence about their 
communicative intention. Let us simplify the case somewhat, and sup-
pose that A had said the following:
(29) A: Jones is raking the leaves.
Even if we ignore the above discussion and assume that A has speaker-
referred to Smith in this case, why is it still tempting to say that A has 
semantically referred to Jones? The answer, I submit, is that A has 
given misleading evidence of their intentions. Specifi cally, I maintain 
that the semantic value of the sentence uttered by A is as follows:
(30) ⟦Jones is raking the leaves⟧ = 
  λpst . (∃xe : x is called Jones)(p = λws . x is raking the leaves at w)
If we suppose that what A meant is a Smith-dependent proposition, 
and that Smith is not normally called ‘Jones’, then the sentence uttered 
by A has a semantic value that gives B misleading evidence about A’s 
intentions. This, in itself, isn’t a problem: since semantic values en-
code defeasible evidence, B may be able to see past this evidence and 
recognize A’s intention anyway. But still, it should not be surprising 
that we pay attention when speakers give misleading evidence of their 
intentions. It is this sort of misleading evidence, I submit, that causes 
us to posit a category of semantic reference when all we need is speaker 
reference.
9. Conclusions
The standard view is that it is expressions (or utterances of expres-
sions) that refer, perhaps with some help from context. Intention-based 
semanticists have tended to follow Strawson (1950) in holding that 
expressions don’t refer, though we can refer with them. Here I have 
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advocated a more radical departure from orthodoxy: expressions don’t 
refer, and we don’t refer with them either, but we do use them to give 
evidence of what we’re referring to.
In arguing for this view, I have also advocated a broader account of 
the cognitive architecture underlying semantic and pragmatic compe-
tence. Pragmatics, on this view, is the study of a special kind of min-
dreading, wherein a speaker intentionally guides the mindreading ca-
pacity of their addressee, in part by revealing their intention to do so. 
Semantics, by contrast, is the study of a modular input/output system 
whose job is to encode and decode partial and defeasible perceptual 
evidence of speakers’ communicative intentions. The semantic value 
of a sentence is just what we can know about what a speaker would 
be saying with it (if they were speaking literally), without knowing 
anything about their intentions or the context. On this view, the se-
mantics–pragmatics interface turns out to coincide with the interface 
between the language module and central cognition.
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